CARE TO SHARE?
On the biomedical front, many researchers are faced with a common challenge. T ey carefully collect data and use them until results are published but do not have the means to properly maintain the data or sof ware long term and/or prepare them for sharing with other scientists. Most research journals are not equipped to review and maintain large annotated databases or sof ware, and small research groups may not have the resources to maintain data, metadata (information about the data that would help others reuse them), and sof ware developed primarily for in-house use. Access to data generated elsewhere is also dif cult. Although public repositories exist, many types of data are not represented, so there is no "home" for them.
Funding agencies and journals increasingly demand that researchers share their data and sof ware with others to ensure reproducibility of results as well as to support new analyses, but the task of developing and maintaining infrastructure to accomplish this demand is hard, time-consuming, and risky because of its high cost and the difculties in recruiting specialized personnel. T e currently used model-peer-to-peer data exchange-becomes quickly intractable when there are a multitude of unknown requesters. Reproducing results of others is dif cult because the same sof ware environment needs to be constructed, which many times requires extensive installation and conf guration of dif erent versions of sofware components.
On the health-care front, there are intriguing parallels. Data collected in the process of care could prove extremely useful for quality improvement initiatives as well as clinical research beyond the source institutions (7) . Besides addressing the lack of data standardization across dif erent institutions, several steps need to be taken to make derivatives of these data available for others in a way that protects individual and institutional privacy and that ascertains data quality. Even when exchanged for care, electronic data from patient records require special protections and a corresponding policy framework that ensures proper consent and compliance with regulations that cut across institutional, state, federal, and international boundaries.
To responsibly exchange these data for research is even more daunting. T e vision of a "learning health-care system" in which all these data can be used for quality improvement and for health services or patient-centered outcomes research is sensible, but enabling this system is not simple (8) . Furthermore, it is not trivial to track data usage to address the public's increasing interest in guarding their own records (9) and in understanding how data and specimens obtained for one purpose (for example, health care or a specif c study) are being used for other purposes, such as secondary analyses in other studies (10) . Because of the high stakes, not all health care organizations have bought into the idea of data sharing; other than the technical challenges, prerequisites such as a system of incentives and a clear business model have to be developed. As research becomes increasingly translational, it is important that these challenges start to be addressed in a systematic way.
Awareness of this data-sharing challenge has prompted dif erent institutions, including the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Institutes of Medicine (IOM), the Agency for Healthcare Research on Quality (AHRQ), and the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) in the United States, as well as international agencies, to assemble experts to discuss current best practices and new models for sharing diverse data, such as whole genomes, images, and structured data items commonly found in electronic health records. For example, the NIH Working Group on Data and Informatics (http://acd.od.nih.gov/diwg.htm) has made important recommendations to the Advisory Committee to the NIH Director. To summarize their recommendations, data and metadata should be shared, incentives should be of ered to those who share
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To Share or Not To Share: That Is Not the Question " " data, and investments in user training and infrastructure need to be coordinated to ensure ef cient use of resources. On the training side, the number and size of programs to train informatics professionals and researchers needs to increase. On the infrastructure side, a backbone for data and sofware sharing needs to be implemented-for example, through a network of biomedical computing centers. Building this network in a rapidly evolving technological landscape will require the development of new models for data sharing.
STATE OF TECHNOLOGY
Although initial technical setup may be complex, dif erent solutions currently exist that allow researchers to share health and biomedical research data that involves human subjects in a privacy-preserving manner. "Cloud" computing has presented new ways in which to build and deliver sof ware, and cloud storage has become mainstream in the digital world (such as the Amazon Cloud Drive and Apple iCloud). Cloud-based initiatives are part of an architectural solution that allows researchers to outsource infrastructure and use resources "on demand. " T is power to scale a computational resource comes at a cost: Economies of scale are achieved by having multiple users use the resources of the cloud, which increases the complexity of managing the security and conf dentiality of the data. In general, the requirements for human-subject data protection are not completely resolved by commercial, public cloud providers (11) . To handle protected health information, these entities would need to sign business associate agreements with the data-contributing institutions; some cloud providers are not yet ready for this responsibility. Human genomes contain biometric information and hence can be considered protected health information, so this creates a problem when using public clouds.
Fortunately, many privacy technology algorithms and policy frameworks are being developed. Policies and technology can protect privacy in the cloud, particularly for specialized solutions that can be implemented in "private" and certain "community" clouds. T ese research clouds hosting protected health information must have a strong emphasis on privacy protection in which the advantages of elastic computing (the provision of on-demand computational resources for a large number of users) should still hold, but the environments handling protected health information are segregated, responsibilities are clearly spelled out, and additional access and quality assurance mechanisms are implemented.
Dif erent models for data sharing in a research community cloud are currently being investigated-for example, in the Johns Hopkins Institute for NanoBioTechnology (http://releases.jhu.edu/2012/11/06/ collecting-cancer-data-in-the-cloud/) and in the iDASH National Center for Biomedical Computing (12) . iDASH stands for "integrating data for analysis, anonymization, and sharing" and is one of six centers funded Fig. 1 . Data-sharing models. To avoid multiple pairwise agreements among institutions, a broker for data can be created. Data contributors specify their requirements for data access by users and sign a contributor data use agreement (DUA). Completing a quality assurance (QA) process is required for data, tool, and VM contributions. Data users also sign a DUA that complies with the requirements of the contributor, so that contributors do not have to negotiate every data-sharing engagement with diff erent institutions. Three models of sharing are displayed. Model 1 is the traditional model, in which users download data for use in their local computers. In model 2, the remote desktop model, users connect to a center but access and analyze data within the center using existing, or their own, algorithms. Model 3 involves virtualization and distributed computation, in which users import software environments (virtual machines, or VMs) to analyze their data using their local computational infrastructures.
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in 2010 by the roadmap initiative at the NIH. T e focus of this initiative is on new models for data sharing that allow researchers and institutions to pass the responsibility of data sharing, computing, and storage of large amounts of protected health information to a third party. T rough technology and policy innovation, centers such as these address different models of data sharing, as illustrated in Fig. 1 and brief y described below.
Users download data. In this traditional model (shown as model 1 in Fig. 1) , data-seekers identify relevant data sources in a distributed or centralized resource (such as a server) and download data to their local computers. However, as data become "big" (giga-to petabytes of data) and issues related to frequency of updates, available network bandwidth, and ascertainment of data provenance (if these data are further distributed) become more common, it is not always practical or desirable to have data downloaded to local computers. T is model, although still highly prevalent in the scientif c community, may not work ideally in the long term. T e liabilities involved on the part of data donors and users are high, and gigabyte networks are still limited to certain institutions. Although deidentif cation and privacy-protection algorithms can mitigate the conf dentiality problem (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) , once data are downloaded there is no way to track their use, and there is still some risk of reidentif cation (18) .
More research in reidentif cation and quantif cation of risk for privacy breaches will help develop policies for this model of sharing, particularly if information about human genomes is going to be shared (19) . In fact, the recent NIH Workshop "Establishing a Central Resource of Data from Genome Sequencing Projects" (http://www. genome.gov/27549169) recommended that "sequence/phenotype/exposure data sets [be] deposited in one or several central databases. " In addition to recommending a central location for such data, the meeting discussions stressed the development of governance methods and policies for central databases that support responsible access to individual data sets. T e U.S. Presidential Bioethics Advisory Committee recently issued a report emphasizing the importance of protecting health information, particularly the data about an individual's genome (20) .
An important feature of centralizing data is the ability to keep harmonized collections for future use. Manipulation of data, such as harmonization across dif erent data sets (preprocessing), may result in products that are as useful-if not more useful-than the original data. By having preprocessing executed on local computers with no easy mechanism to upload preprocessed data back to the collective data resource, the user downloads model usually only provides one-way resource sharing. Participants of the NIH Workshop recommended that harmonization of data retrospectively should be captured in the central databases. Despite some limitations, this data-sharing mechanism is well understood by researchers and institutions and is still practical for small, nonsensitive ("sanitized") data that are not being requested with very high frequency.
Users access and analyze data remotely. In this model (shown as model 2 in Fig. 1 ), no data are downloaded, and they remain protected in centralized or distributed data sets. Users can perform analyses using preexisting sof ware (located where data reside) or submit their own sof ware. Given the need to protect privacy, the sofware undergoes a specialized quality assurance process so as to ensure that no data are leaked with the results of the computation. Although this model requires users to be connected to the Internet, liabilities are reduced in the case of lost or stolen computers. T e environment is admittedly a little less f exible than the data download model but can be privacy-protected and of er computational resources that may not be available to the user of the data in his or her institution. It also of ers auditing capabilities to the data-hosting center that are not possible when data are downloaded by the users.
A variety of operating systems, applications, and data sets are required to support this model because it is hard to predict what users will need. Besides protecting the data, this model is especially useful if the user is going to perform demanding operations on large, sensitive data sets, such as genome queries. For example, if the researcher wants to perform de novo assembly of a large genome such as that of an individual patient, but does not have the computational infrastructure, she could use this model to compute "in the cloud. "
Users import whole software environments. T is model (shown as model 3 in Fig. 1) is similar to the remote access model above, except that instead of having users use external computational resources, the users download virtual machines (VMs) to compute in their own hardware with their local data. T e VM import model can also enable distributed computation, with each party installing the same VM and contributing results of its local computation to a coordinating center. For example, we have shown that it is possible to create an accurate predictive model by exporting the computation to dif erent centers and aggregating results only, without any individual patient data ever being transferred (21) .
T e advantage of this model is that the same sof ware environment can be reproduced, and users do not need to spend time installing specif c versions of operating systems and applications. T us, results are more likely to be reproducible. T is model is useful when data cannot be transferred outside of an institution, as is the case in several health-care organizations in the United States or when legislation prevents transmission of data from an international collaborator outside their country.
T is model also enables the creation of a network of collaborating centers, even if institutional policies disallow sharing of data at the individual level. For example, a researcher who wants to build a prognostic model for patients with a particular disease but has limited data at her own institution may need data from several centers. She would like to use a multivariate model to adjust for potential confounders, but she is not able to access such patient-level data at different institutions. With this model, she can combine coef cients and covariance matrices calculated locally at each institution (using the same VM) and transmitted to a central node. Another example in which this model is benef cial is when genomic data need to stay at one institution, but the phenotype data for the same patient is hosted in a dif erent institution-and neither is able to transmit patient-level data to the other. Some algorithms can be decomposed so that multivariate models can be constructed across these "vertically" separated data. T is may be one of the most ef ective ways to deal with international collaborations in which legislation against physical placement of data outside of the country may currently prevent some data-sharing initiatives.
STATE OF POLICY
Although technical solutions to data sharing are complex and varied, they may not be as challenging as the solutions for policy issues (22) (23) (24) (25) . T e multiplicity of institutional policies, dif erent types of consent, and different interpretations of what constitutes a small risk for reidentif cation point to the on April 5, 2017 http://stm.sciencemag.org/ Downloaded from " " need for solutions that will largely be based on proper enforcement of well-designed policies and regulations. For example, there has been discussion on whether access to a community cloud resource could be granted depending on user "certif cations" that would require training in responsible conduct of research, among other things. Simplif cation of data-use agreements (DUAs) could be codif ed in addition to state and federal requirements and enforced through a network composed of several data-hosting centers. For example, iDASH investigators have worked with legal council at the University of California to develop a simple system to facilitate data "donation" and data "utilization" by dif erent parties through data contributor agreements and data user agreements. T is way, there are no pairwise DUAs between institutions and those who want to access the data. Observing the terms of use specif ed by the data contributor agreement, iDASH becomes responsible for the distribution of the data. A DUA system covers some of the requirements of datasharing models 1 and 2 described above.
Other items that need attention are the use of appropriate access controls, depending on the sensitivity of the data (such as two-factor authentication). Additionally, algorithms for deidentif cation, data obfuscation, and methods to evaluate the risk of reidentif cation incurred in the disclosure of "limited data sets" (data sets for which certain identif ers were removed) are also needed. With the whole genome constituting the ultimate identif er for an individual, special protection needs to be implemented when these kinds of data are linked to other sensitive information.
A SHARED FUTURE
T e time has come to address the need to make better use of the avalanche of health care and biomedical research data that are being currently generated through both private and public funding. All of those involved in health sciences research have a keen interest in preventing and alleviating the burden of human disease. T ere are technical and policy solutions to support data sharing that respect individual and institutional privacy and at the same time provide a public good that can help accelerate research. Several models of data sharing exist. We are just beginning to understand the ecosystem of sharing and to build systems that support these models. T e increasing engagement of the public with translational scientists who are at the forefront of the battle against disease is changing the way we collectively look at data sharing: It is not an option, it is a necessity. Turning data into a public good in a way that respects patient privacy will af ect translational research and human health in unprecedented ways.
